(click on the heading above for full interview)
The startling nature of the coverup of wrongdoing in the current financial crisis is revealed by William K Black. He has the perfect credentials for making this indictment ...he ran the Savings and Loan cleanup in the 1980's.
Quite successfully, mind you.
This is something everyone can understand and must take to heart. The next financial crisis is baked in and there is no recovery from the current crisis until the issues Black discusses are addressed.
Showing posts with label financial crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label financial crisis. Show all posts
Saturday, August 14, 2010
Thursday, July 29, 2010
U.S. Needs To Articulate Credible Fiscal Consolidation Plan - Moody's:
U.S. government needs to articulate clearly a credible plan to tackle its bulging debt profile in order to keep its triple-A credit rating, Moody's Investors Service's lead sovereign analyst for the country said Thursday. The comments indicate
Moody's views on the U.S. have changed little since the ratings agency warned in March on the need for action, and hints a sense of urgency is required from the U.S. government to deal with its rising borrowing needs and interest costs. Dow Jones A sense of urgency?! Give me a break, they have the patience of Job. It is an outrage that the outlook for US is not negative in my opinion.
Moody's views on the U.S. have changed little since the ratings agency warned in March on the need for action, and hints a sense of urgency is required from the U.S. government to deal with its rising borrowing needs and interest costs. Dow Jones A sense of urgency?! Give me a break, they have the patience of Job. It is an outrage that the outlook for US is not negative in my opinion.
Tuesday, July 27, 2010
Ford works with the SEC on a sale of bonds backed by auto loans
Politicians, in their naieve zeal to regulate, have forced a pre-birth exception to the new law that is likely to become permanent:
Ford Motor Credit delayed a sale of bonds backed by auto loans last week because of regulatory uncertainty caused by the financial overhaul. On Monday, Ford sold a billion-dollar bond by working with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Ford and
the SEC created a reprieve to a part of the law that holds credit rating agencies liable for ratings they issue. "Clearly, the SEC recognizes the importance of the public [asset-backed securities] markets, and we are glad the staff is taking temporary measures to ensure public markets continue to be available by establishing a transitional period through Jan. 24, 2011," a spokeswoman wrote.
The Wall Street Journal
The SEC realizes the importance of keeping credit markets open; laws written by lobbyists and political operatives with no actual experience of real life business operations are inevitably going to harm the economy. They will force "exceptions" until the reality of daily business makes a mockery of the law now administered by an increased burocracy at immense permanent additional expense to the taxpayer.
Ford Motor Credit delayed a sale of bonds backed by auto loans last week because of regulatory uncertainty caused by the financial overhaul. On Monday, Ford sold a billion-dollar bond by working with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Ford and
the SEC created a reprieve to a part of the law that holds credit rating agencies liable for ratings they issue. "Clearly, the SEC recognizes the importance of the public [asset-backed securities] markets, and we are glad the staff is taking temporary measures to ensure public markets continue to be available by establishing a transitional period through Jan. 24, 2011," a spokeswoman wrote.
The Wall Street Journal
The SEC realizes the importance of keeping credit markets open; laws written by lobbyists and political operatives with no actual experience of real life business operations are inevitably going to harm the economy. They will force "exceptions" until the reality of daily business makes a mockery of the law now administered by an increased burocracy at immense permanent additional expense to the taxpayer.
Thursday, July 8, 2010
Mid-Year Update: Taxation should be about raising the maximum amount of revenue for the government in the least economically disruptive way.
Equities of all persuasion saw mid-year losses after a first quarter surge.
MARKET RETURNS
Year-to-date (1/1/10-07/02/10)*
Dow Jones Indus Avg. -7.38%
S&P 500 -8.44%
NASDAQ -7.96%
Russell 2000 -4.23%
MSCI World Index -11.33%
DJ STOXX Europe 600 -6.55%
Year-to-date (1/1/10-07/01/10)
90 Day T-Bill 0.09%
2-Year Treasury 1.46%
10-Year Treasury 5.91%
ML High Yield Index 2.79%
JPM EMBI Global Diversified 5.40%
JP Morgan Global Hedged 4.42%
Year-to-date (1/1/10-07/01/10)
U.S. $ / Euro (1.26) -11.9%
U.S. $ / British Pound (1.52) -6.2%
Yen / U.S. ($ 87.74) -5.7%
Gold ($/oz) ($1,210.68) 10.4%
Oil ($72.01) -9.3%
*Returns reported as of 9:15 a.m. Pacific Standard Time
What accounts for the second quarter downturn?
Various theories are being put forward.
One is that corporations are pulling pro fits forward into 2010 to avoid the higher taxes coming in 2011. Yes, it is still possible to manipulate earnings despite Sarbanes-Oxley, you just have to be smarter than before.
Another possible reason for the decline is the fear of a double dip recession starting early next year. This is supported in part by numerous factors including robbing 2011 results by the earnings manipulations described above, expiration of the Federal economic stimulus (yes, even bad stimulus has some effect on the economy) and uncertainty arising from the fallout expected from the financial reform legislation now pending in Congress and the actual fallout from the health care legislation.
Finally, there is the expectation that corporate earnings and competitive position internationally will be negatively affected by the higher corporate tax rates
in 2011. The often repeated mantra that ‘the more you tax something the less of it you get’ is running into opposition by the Obama administration which is more concerned with ‘fairness’.
Taxation should be about raising the maximum amount of revenue for the government in the least economically disruptive way. Fairness should be addressed on the spending side of the ledger. To mix the two politicizes revenue raising and invites special interests to corrupt the taxation process with social engineering thereby doing greater harm to the economy.
Individual investors have still to be heard from since they are expected to take profits on their holdings before year-end to avoid higher tax rates.
Such individuals may well opt to sit on the cash proceeds from such tax sales until the outlook clarifies. This will only add to short term market weakness.
Despite the fact that Congress seems to be playing a losing hand, they seem unlikely to change course before the November elections.
Should the Democrats lose control of the House of Representatives, we can expect a major market rally since a stalemated Congress would be a welcome relief for the markets.
This may be short lived, however, since a lame duck Congress may well try to finish their agenda before leaving office (think carbon tax or a VAT). In short, equities don’t look promising between now and November and don’t look all that great for next year.
A healthy position in cash and gold still look like safe bets.
Interest Rate Outlook
At mid-year we see ten year Treasuries below 3% and thirty year Treasuries below 4%.
What would possess an asset manager to buy 30 year Treasuries with a locked in yield of 4% when the outlook for inflation over the next few years promises to make this a loosing proposition if not a disastrous one?
The only answer I can devise is fear and special situations.
Fear by those who have gotten burned in the financial crisis and therefore consider credit risk in the short term more important than market risk over the longer term.
Special situation buyers include insurance companies who are matching long term
payout commitments on annuities with the interest payments on the Treasuries.
Other special situation players would be hedge funds playing the carry trade game where they buy these Treasuries with short term loans at 25 basis points. It is this group who represent the greatest threat to the interest rate outlook since they
will unload their positions en masse the moment they see a turn in rates.
This is why I feel an interest rate rise will come suddenly and not be dependant on actual inflation. It may in fact be a cause of the inflation.
Considerable media attention has been given to the municipal bond market in recent weeks.
We see yields on ten year AAA munis going from 3.91% at year end 2008 to 3.25% at year end 2009 to 3.13% at mid-year 2010.
Much of this decline is due to the high demand for tax free munis by individual investors in high tax states as well as generally, given the pending tax rate rises in 2011.
The decline in muni yields is also influenced by the continued perception that munis are safe because they have always been so. This perception is due some re-evaluation.
Municipalities have rarely faced the kind of budget pressures they are experiencing today because of the revenue declines resulting from the recession. Added to this is the retirement of government employed baby boomers, whose pension liabilities have gone mostly unfunded.
This is an increase in current expenditures which is not discretionary and growing rapidly. It promises to create a budget crisis at the city and county level since these entities now face a cash expense they can no longer ignore.
Warren Buffet, who rushed into the bond insurance business during the financial crisis has since backed away. He notes that in the coming budget crunch, municipalities will likely stiff insurers or bondholders before firing employees. Bankruptcy filings may also prove to be more palatable politically than cutting services.
In any case, don’t think that past history is the best indication of what the future holds for municipal bonds.
Thanks to Richard Lehmann at incomesecurities.com and Payden & Rygel [paydenrygel@payden.com]for the data tables
MARKET RETURNS
Year-to-date (1/1/10-07/02/10)*
Dow Jones Indus Avg. -7.38%
S&P 500 -8.44%
NASDAQ -7.96%
Russell 2000 -4.23%
MSCI World Index -11.33%
DJ STOXX Europe 600 -6.55%
Year-to-date (1/1/10-07/01/10)
90 Day T-Bill 0.09%
2-Year Treasury 1.46%
10-Year Treasury 5.91%
ML High Yield Index 2.79%
JPM EMBI Global Diversified 5.40%
JP Morgan Global Hedged 4.42%
Year-to-date (1/1/10-07/01/10)
U.S. $ / Euro (1.26) -11.9%
U.S. $ / British Pound (1.52) -6.2%
Yen / U.S. ($ 87.74) -5.7%
Gold ($/oz) ($1,210.68) 10.4%
Oil ($72.01) -9.3%
*Returns reported as of 9:15 a.m. Pacific Standard Time
What accounts for the second quarter downturn?
Various theories are being put forward.
One is that corporations are pulling pro fits forward into 2010 to avoid the higher taxes coming in 2011. Yes, it is still possible to manipulate earnings despite Sarbanes-Oxley, you just have to be smarter than before.
Another possible reason for the decline is the fear of a double dip recession starting early next year. This is supported in part by numerous factors including robbing 2011 results by the earnings manipulations described above, expiration of the Federal economic stimulus (yes, even bad stimulus has some effect on the economy) and uncertainty arising from the fallout expected from the financial reform legislation now pending in Congress and the actual fallout from the health care legislation.
Finally, there is the expectation that corporate earnings and competitive position internationally will be negatively affected by the higher corporate tax rates
in 2011. The often repeated mantra that ‘the more you tax something the less of it you get’ is running into opposition by the Obama administration which is more concerned with ‘fairness’.
Taxation should be about raising the maximum amount of revenue for the government in the least economically disruptive way. Fairness should be addressed on the spending side of the ledger. To mix the two politicizes revenue raising and invites special interests to corrupt the taxation process with social engineering thereby doing greater harm to the economy.
Individual investors have still to be heard from since they are expected to take profits on their holdings before year-end to avoid higher tax rates.
Such individuals may well opt to sit on the cash proceeds from such tax sales until the outlook clarifies. This will only add to short term market weakness.
Despite the fact that Congress seems to be playing a losing hand, they seem unlikely to change course before the November elections.
Should the Democrats lose control of the House of Representatives, we can expect a major market rally since a stalemated Congress would be a welcome relief for the markets.
This may be short lived, however, since a lame duck Congress may well try to finish their agenda before leaving office (think carbon tax or a VAT). In short, equities don’t look promising between now and November and don’t look all that great for next year.
A healthy position in cash and gold still look like safe bets.
Interest Rate Outlook
At mid-year we see ten year Treasuries below 3% and thirty year Treasuries below 4%.
What would possess an asset manager to buy 30 year Treasuries with a locked in yield of 4% when the outlook for inflation over the next few years promises to make this a loosing proposition if not a disastrous one?
The only answer I can devise is fear and special situations.
Fear by those who have gotten burned in the financial crisis and therefore consider credit risk in the short term more important than market risk over the longer term.
Special situation buyers include insurance companies who are matching long term
payout commitments on annuities with the interest payments on the Treasuries.
Other special situation players would be hedge funds playing the carry trade game where they buy these Treasuries with short term loans at 25 basis points. It is this group who represent the greatest threat to the interest rate outlook since they
will unload their positions en masse the moment they see a turn in rates.
This is why I feel an interest rate rise will come suddenly and not be dependant on actual inflation. It may in fact be a cause of the inflation.
Considerable media attention has been given to the municipal bond market in recent weeks.
We see yields on ten year AAA munis going from 3.91% at year end 2008 to 3.25% at year end 2009 to 3.13% at mid-year 2010.
Much of this decline is due to the high demand for tax free munis by individual investors in high tax states as well as generally, given the pending tax rate rises in 2011.
The decline in muni yields is also influenced by the continued perception that munis are safe because they have always been so. This perception is due some re-evaluation.
Municipalities have rarely faced the kind of budget pressures they are experiencing today because of the revenue declines resulting from the recession. Added to this is the retirement of government employed baby boomers, whose pension liabilities have gone mostly unfunded.
This is an increase in current expenditures which is not discretionary and growing rapidly. It promises to create a budget crisis at the city and county level since these entities now face a cash expense they can no longer ignore.
Warren Buffet, who rushed into the bond insurance business during the financial crisis has since backed away. He notes that in the coming budget crunch, municipalities will likely stiff insurers or bondholders before firing employees. Bankruptcy filings may also prove to be more palatable politically than cutting services.
In any case, don’t think that past history is the best indication of what the future holds for municipal bonds.
Thanks to Richard Lehmann at incomesecurities.com and Payden & Rygel [paydenrygel@payden.com]for the data tables
Government not true to its Founding Principles?
Rather than remaining true to its founding principles, successive leaderships have led the country deeper and deeper into foreign entanglements, and further and further down the road of populism of the sort that has left Europe gasping for breath.
The situation has now reached a crossroads. In one direction, the direction we here at Casey Research steadily advocate, there is real hope. That hope is based on remembering the principles of self-reliance that made America so economically powerful in its early career – a haven with a relatively short list of reasonable laws and regulations, administered by a minimal bureaucracy supported by a modest and simplified tax code.
Economic historian Niall Ferguson recently commented on the surprising lack of dialogue about this path in America. You can, and should, watch this video by clicking on the headline above.
The situation has now reached a crossroads. In one direction, the direction we here at Casey Research steadily advocate, there is real hope. That hope is based on remembering the principles of self-reliance that made America so economically powerful in its early career – a haven with a relatively short list of reasonable laws and regulations, administered by a minimal bureaucracy supported by a modest and simplified tax code.
Economic historian Niall Ferguson recently commented on the surprising lack of dialogue about this path in America. You can, and should, watch this video by clicking on the headline above.
Wednesday, July 7, 2010
Answer to the financial crisis is less regulation, an economist says
Forrest Capie, professor emeritus of economic history at the Cass Business School, said government officials and regulators dealing with the financial crisis should find inspiration from the 19th century. "The story I have to tell you is a story of caution, depression and the world of debt," Capie said. "Caution is the big lesson to be learnt from the financial crisis, and the other is there is nothing new." He said the answer to the crisis is not over-regulation but an appropriate, proportionate application of regulation.
Risk.net/Risk magazine
Risk.net/Risk magazine
Friday, June 25, 2010
Summary Of Major Provisions In Financial Overhaul Bill
WASHINGTON -(Dow Jones)- The sweeping financial overhaul legislation negotiators wrapped up early Friday morning would constitute the biggest overhaul of U.S. financial regulations since the 1930s. The legislation, broadly, is designed to close the regulatory gaps and end the speculative trading practices that contributed to the 2008 financial market crisis. Major components of the bill include:
NEW REGULATORY AUTHORITY: Gives federal regulators new authority to seize and break up large troubled financial firms without taxpayer bailouts in cases where the firm's collapse could destabilize the financial system. Sets up a liquidation procedure run by the FDIC. Treasury would supply funds to cover the up-front costs of winding down the failed firm, but the government would have to put a "repayment plan" in place. Regulators would recoup any losses incurred from the wind-down afterwards by assessing fees on financial firms with more than $50 billion in assets.
FINANCIAL STABILITY COUNCIL: Would establish a new, 10-member Financial Stability Oversight Council, comprising existing regulators charged with monitoring and addressing system-wide risks to the nation's financial stability. Among its duties, the council would recommend to the Fed stricter capital, leverage and other rules for large, complex financial firms that are judged to threaten the financial system. In extreme cases, it would have the power to break up financial firms.
VOLCKER RULE: Would curb propriety trading by the largest financial firms, though banks could make de minimus investments in hedge and private-equity funds. Those investments would be limited to 3% or less of a bank's Tier 1 capital. Banks would be prohibited from bailing out a fund in which they are invested.
DERIVATIVES: Would for the first time extend comprehensive regulation to the over-the-counter derivatives market, including the trading of the products and the companies that sell them. Would require many routine derivatives to be traded on exchanges and routed through clearinghouses. Customized swaps could still be traded over-the-counter, but they would have to be reported to central repositories so regulators could get a broader picture of what's going on in the market. Would impose new capital, margin, reporting, record-keeping and business conduct rules on firms that deal in derivatives.
SWAPS SPIN-OFF: Would require banks to spin off only their riskiest derivatives trading operations into affiliates, in a late-night compromise struck to scale back a controversial provision championed by Sen. Blanche Lincoln (D., Ark.). Banks would be able to retain operations for interest-rate swaps, foreign-exchange swaps, and gold and silver swaps among others. Firms would be required to push trading in agriculture, uncleared commodities, most metals, and energy swaps to their affiliates.
CONSUMER AGENCY: Would create a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau within the Federal Reserve, with rulemaking and some enforcement power over banks and non-banks that offer consumer financial products or services such as credit cards, mortgages and other loans. The new watchdog would have authority to examine and enforce regulations for all mortgage-related businesses; banks and credit unions with assets of more than $10 billion in assets; pay day lenders, check cashers and certain other non-bank financial firms. Auto dealers won a hard-fought exemption from the Bureau's reach.
PRE-EMPTION: Would allow states to impose their own stricter consumer protection laws on national banks. National banks could seek exemption from state laws on a case-by-case, state-by-state basis if a state law "prevents or significantly interferes" with the bank's ability to do business - a higher bar than federal regulators currently must meet to pre-empt state rules. State attorneys-general would have power to enforce certain rules issued by the new consumer financial protection bureau.
FEDERAL RESERVE OVERSIGHT: Would mandate a one-time audit of all of the Fed's emergency lending programs from the financial crisis. The Fed also would disclose, with a two-year lag, details of loans it makes to banks through its discount window as well as open market transactions - activity the Fed currently doesn't disclose. Would eliminate the role of bankers in picking presidents at the Fed's 12 regional banks. Would also limit the Fed's 13(3) emergency lending authority by barring the central bank from using it to aid an individual firm, requiring the Treasury Secretary to approve any lending program and prohibiting the participation of insolvent firms.
OVERSIGHT CHANGES: Would eliminate the Office of Thrift Supervision, but after a fight, the Fed retained oversight of thousands of community banks. Would empower the Fed to supervise the largest, most complex financial companies to ensure that the government understands the risks and complexities of firms that could pose a risk to the broader economy.
BANK CAPITAL STANDARDS: Would set new size- and risk-based capital standards, including a prohibition on large bank holding companies treating trust-preferred securities as Tier 1 capital, a key measure of a bank's strength. Would grandfather trust-preferred securities for banks with less than $15 billion in assets, enabling them to continue treating the securities as Tier 1 capital. Larger banks would have five years to phase-out trust-preferred securities as Tier 1 capital.
BANK FEE: Would mandate the Oversight Council to impose a special assessment on the nation's largest financial firms to raise up to $19 billion to offset the cost of the bill. The fee would apply to financial institutions with more than $ 50 billion in assets and hedge funds with more than $10 billion in assets, with entities deemed high risk paying more than safer ones. The fee would be collected by the FDIC over five years, with the funds placed in separate fund in the Treasury and would not be usable for any other purpose for 25 years, after which any left-over funds would go to pay down the national debt.
DEPOSIT INSURANCE: Would permanently increase the level of federal deposit insurance for banks, thrifts and credit unions to $250,000, retroactive to January 1, 2008.
MORTGAGES: Would establish new national minimum underwriting standards for home mortgages. Lenders would be required for the first time to ensure that a borrower is able to repay a home loan by verifying the borrower's income, credit history and job status. Would ban payments to brokers for steering borrowers to high-priced loans.
SECURITIZATION: Banks that package loans would, broadly, be required to keep 5% of the credit risk on their balance sheets. Would direct bank regulators to exempt from the rules a class of low-risk mortgages that meet certain minimum standards. Regulators could permit alternative risk-retention arrangements for the commercial mortgage-backed securities market.
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: Would revamp the credit-rating industry, establishing a new quasi-government entity designed to address conflicts of interest inherent in the credit-rating business after the SEC studies the matter. Would also allow investors to sue credit-rating firms for a "knowing or reckless" failure to conduct a reasonable investigation, a lower liability standard than the firms were lobbying to get. Would establish a new oversight office within the SEC with the ability to fine ratings agencies and empowers the SEC to deregister a firm that gives too many bad ratings over time.
INVESTMENT ADVICE: Would give the SEC the authority to raise standards for broker dealers who give investment advice after the agency studies the issue. Would permit, but not require, the SEC to hold broker dealers to a fiduciary duty similar to the standard to which investment advisers are held.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: Would give shareholders of public corporations a non- binding vote on executive pay and "golden parachutes," and would give the SEC the authority to grant shareholders proxy access to nominate directors.
HEDGE FUNDS: Would require hedge funds and private equity funds to register with the SEC as investment advisers and to provide information on trades to help regulators monitor systemic risk.
INSURANCE: Would create a new Federal Insurance Office within the Treasury Department to monitor the insurance industry, recommending to the systemic risk council insurers that should be treated as systemically important. Would require the new office to report to Congress on ways to modernize insurance regulation.
-By Victoria McGrane, Dow Jones Newswires; 202-862-9267; victoria.mcgrane@ dowjones.com
(Michael R. Crittenden, Sarah N. Lynch and Jessica Holzer contributed to this story)
(END) Dow Jones Newswires
06-25-100616ET
Copyright (c) 2010 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
NEW REGULATORY AUTHORITY: Gives federal regulators new authority to seize and break up large troubled financial firms without taxpayer bailouts in cases where the firm's collapse could destabilize the financial system. Sets up a liquidation procedure run by the FDIC. Treasury would supply funds to cover the up-front costs of winding down the failed firm, but the government would have to put a "repayment plan" in place. Regulators would recoup any losses incurred from the wind-down afterwards by assessing fees on financial firms with more than $50 billion in assets.
FINANCIAL STABILITY COUNCIL: Would establish a new, 10-member Financial Stability Oversight Council, comprising existing regulators charged with monitoring and addressing system-wide risks to the nation's financial stability. Among its duties, the council would recommend to the Fed stricter capital, leverage and other rules for large, complex financial firms that are judged to threaten the financial system. In extreme cases, it would have the power to break up financial firms.
VOLCKER RULE: Would curb propriety trading by the largest financial firms, though banks could make de minimus investments in hedge and private-equity funds. Those investments would be limited to 3% or less of a bank's Tier 1 capital. Banks would be prohibited from bailing out a fund in which they are invested.
DERIVATIVES: Would for the first time extend comprehensive regulation to the over-the-counter derivatives market, including the trading of the products and the companies that sell them. Would require many routine derivatives to be traded on exchanges and routed through clearinghouses. Customized swaps could still be traded over-the-counter, but they would have to be reported to central repositories so regulators could get a broader picture of what's going on in the market. Would impose new capital, margin, reporting, record-keeping and business conduct rules on firms that deal in derivatives.
SWAPS SPIN-OFF: Would require banks to spin off only their riskiest derivatives trading operations into affiliates, in a late-night compromise struck to scale back a controversial provision championed by Sen. Blanche Lincoln (D., Ark.). Banks would be able to retain operations for interest-rate swaps, foreign-exchange swaps, and gold and silver swaps among others. Firms would be required to push trading in agriculture, uncleared commodities, most metals, and energy swaps to their affiliates.
CONSUMER AGENCY: Would create a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau within the Federal Reserve, with rulemaking and some enforcement power over banks and non-banks that offer consumer financial products or services such as credit cards, mortgages and other loans. The new watchdog would have authority to examine and enforce regulations for all mortgage-related businesses; banks and credit unions with assets of more than $10 billion in assets; pay day lenders, check cashers and certain other non-bank financial firms. Auto dealers won a hard-fought exemption from the Bureau's reach.
PRE-EMPTION: Would allow states to impose their own stricter consumer protection laws on national banks. National banks could seek exemption from state laws on a case-by-case, state-by-state basis if a state law "prevents or significantly interferes" with the bank's ability to do business - a higher bar than federal regulators currently must meet to pre-empt state rules. State attorneys-general would have power to enforce certain rules issued by the new consumer financial protection bureau.
FEDERAL RESERVE OVERSIGHT: Would mandate a one-time audit of all of the Fed's emergency lending programs from the financial crisis. The Fed also would disclose, with a two-year lag, details of loans it makes to banks through its discount window as well as open market transactions - activity the Fed currently doesn't disclose. Would eliminate the role of bankers in picking presidents at the Fed's 12 regional banks. Would also limit the Fed's 13(3) emergency lending authority by barring the central bank from using it to aid an individual firm, requiring the Treasury Secretary to approve any lending program and prohibiting the participation of insolvent firms.
OVERSIGHT CHANGES: Would eliminate the Office of Thrift Supervision, but after a fight, the Fed retained oversight of thousands of community banks. Would empower the Fed to supervise the largest, most complex financial companies to ensure that the government understands the risks and complexities of firms that could pose a risk to the broader economy.
BANK CAPITAL STANDARDS: Would set new size- and risk-based capital standards, including a prohibition on large bank holding companies treating trust-preferred securities as Tier 1 capital, a key measure of a bank's strength. Would grandfather trust-preferred securities for banks with less than $15 billion in assets, enabling them to continue treating the securities as Tier 1 capital. Larger banks would have five years to phase-out trust-preferred securities as Tier 1 capital.
BANK FEE: Would mandate the Oversight Council to impose a special assessment on the nation's largest financial firms to raise up to $19 billion to offset the cost of the bill. The fee would apply to financial institutions with more than $ 50 billion in assets and hedge funds with more than $10 billion in assets, with entities deemed high risk paying more than safer ones. The fee would be collected by the FDIC over five years, with the funds placed in separate fund in the Treasury and would not be usable for any other purpose for 25 years, after which any left-over funds would go to pay down the national debt.
DEPOSIT INSURANCE: Would permanently increase the level of federal deposit insurance for banks, thrifts and credit unions to $250,000, retroactive to January 1, 2008.
MORTGAGES: Would establish new national minimum underwriting standards for home mortgages. Lenders would be required for the first time to ensure that a borrower is able to repay a home loan by verifying the borrower's income, credit history and job status. Would ban payments to brokers for steering borrowers to high-priced loans.
SECURITIZATION: Banks that package loans would, broadly, be required to keep 5% of the credit risk on their balance sheets. Would direct bank regulators to exempt from the rules a class of low-risk mortgages that meet certain minimum standards. Regulators could permit alternative risk-retention arrangements for the commercial mortgage-backed securities market.
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: Would revamp the credit-rating industry, establishing a new quasi-government entity designed to address conflicts of interest inherent in the credit-rating business after the SEC studies the matter. Would also allow investors to sue credit-rating firms for a "knowing or reckless" failure to conduct a reasonable investigation, a lower liability standard than the firms were lobbying to get. Would establish a new oversight office within the SEC with the ability to fine ratings agencies and empowers the SEC to deregister a firm that gives too many bad ratings over time.
INVESTMENT ADVICE: Would give the SEC the authority to raise standards for broker dealers who give investment advice after the agency studies the issue. Would permit, but not require, the SEC to hold broker dealers to a fiduciary duty similar to the standard to which investment advisers are held.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: Would give shareholders of public corporations a non- binding vote on executive pay and "golden parachutes," and would give the SEC the authority to grant shareholders proxy access to nominate directors.
HEDGE FUNDS: Would require hedge funds and private equity funds to register with the SEC as investment advisers and to provide information on trades to help regulators monitor systemic risk.
INSURANCE: Would create a new Federal Insurance Office within the Treasury Department to monitor the insurance industry, recommending to the systemic risk council insurers that should be treated as systemically important. Would require the new office to report to Congress on ways to modernize insurance regulation.
-By Victoria McGrane, Dow Jones Newswires; 202-862-9267; victoria.mcgrane@ dowjones.com
(Michael R. Crittenden, Sarah N. Lynch and Jessica Holzer contributed to this story)
(END) Dow Jones Newswires
06-25-100616ET
Copyright (c) 2010 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
Friday, May 22, 2009
Is Mr. Geithner speaking today?
Thank to Jack Crooks. This is a MUST READ RANT!
http://www.blackswantrading.com/files/articles/5b3a61794823258ee9df38f59319d335bsccc052209.pdf
FX Trading – Dollar Shrug! No surprise. Is Mr. Geithner speaking today? He is becoming such a joy for dollar bears, as John Ross mentioned in his closing to CC yesterday. And the dollar doom and gloom crowd is smelling blood in the water; rightly so! There are a lot of short dollar trades on it seems. We surmise Pimco has a big dollar short position given Bond King Bill Gross’s recent public musing about the US may lose its AAA rating. Comments like that shouldn’t be a surprise to anyone given the US government’s desire to take on the role of global stimulus King instead of just worrying about getting its own house in order—pathetic! Mr. Geithner says the US depends on other countries to grow and chastises them for not throwing enough of their taxpayers’ money into the “stimulus” program. Maybe he should take a look at that before he speaks…Of course the crony insiders tell us how “smart” Mr. Geithner is, and we don’t doubt his intelligence. Anyone that can avoid paying personal income taxes and still pull-off an appointment to Treasury Secretary (and run the IRS) is pretty smart. But our gripe is the fact that the guy instills negative confidence in the market place not because he lacks “leadership qualities,” as some have suggested, but because his economics seems all screwed up in my most humble opinion. We are in a gut wrenching transition in the global economy because the wildest orgy of debt the world has ever seen is over. Thus, excesses across all sectors, especially financial, must be removed from the marketplace in order for real quality long-term globally balanced growth to take hold. Instead, day after day we witness dinosaur saving from Geithner and friends, while stunningly they tell us this with a straight face (as straight as any government official possibly can) that we need to put more debt into the market in order to solve the problem of too much debt being in the market. Mr. Orwell call your office!
Now granted, few of us have toiled away at the top economic Ivy League institutions and rubbed elbows and other things against the top seers. Granted, we don’t have the luxury of feeding our ideas and inputs into the most sophisticated econometrics models imaginable built of course by the “best and brightest.” But it seems our angst grows from something the power elites don’t have—common sense. Putting more debt into a system desperately working to alleviate debt is just plain stupid no matter how the Neo-Keynesians slice or dice it. Is it any wonder why the globe is losing confidence in the dollar? It seems the guys that are supposed to be on our side consistently cow-tow to the other side. And of course, you know where I’m going here—China. It is farcical when China criticizes the US for overconsumption and not saving enough. They were enriched precisely because of the overconsumption, besides playing our multi-national “leaders” like a violin by offering cheap labor and short-term riches in turn for giving them technology which sooner or later will lead to the wiping out western business and sunk shareholder value as we know it. But that is another story for another day. The symbiotic game of China shipping containers full of stuff to the US for Federal Reserve Notes dwindling in value ended with the credit crunch. And guess which of the two formerly symbiotic players is getting crunched harder—if you said China you would have been right. But, in their Orwellian world of global chess, the Chinese pretend they are outperforming anything that moves. And their noises and lies and bluffs and fake economic numbers cannot deny the fact that if Mr. US Consumer does not get this symbiotic game of dollars for stuff going again, the Politburo may be out of a job—literally thrown out of a job, if you know what I mean. So, instead of realizing this upper hand of consumer demand the US possesses, the US government economic “leaders” agree with China that yes—it is highly important to stimulate the globe, we want 2001 again. If successful it would mean China continues to add global market share to their manufacturing behemoth and can avoid the dirty hard job of developing a domestic market.
Jack Crooks, Black Swan Capital LLC
www.blackswantrading.com
Black Swan Capital’s Currency Currents is strictly an informational publication and does not provide individual, customized
investment advice. The money you allocate to futures or forex should be strictly the money you can afford to risk. Detailed
disclaimer can be found at http://www.blackswantrading.com/disclaimer.html
Please read the whole article here:http://www.blackswantrading.com/files/articles/5b3a61794823258ee9df38f59319d335bsccc052209.pdf
http://www.blackswantrading.com/files/articles/5b3a61794823258ee9df38f59319d335bsccc052209.pdf
FX Trading – Dollar Shrug! No surprise. Is Mr. Geithner speaking today? He is becoming such a joy for dollar bears, as John Ross mentioned in his closing to CC yesterday. And the dollar doom and gloom crowd is smelling blood in the water; rightly so! There are a lot of short dollar trades on it seems. We surmise Pimco has a big dollar short position given Bond King Bill Gross’s recent public musing about the US may lose its AAA rating. Comments like that shouldn’t be a surprise to anyone given the US government’s desire to take on the role of global stimulus King instead of just worrying about getting its own house in order—pathetic! Mr. Geithner says the US depends on other countries to grow and chastises them for not throwing enough of their taxpayers’ money into the “stimulus” program. Maybe he should take a look at that before he speaks…Of course the crony insiders tell us how “smart” Mr. Geithner is, and we don’t doubt his intelligence. Anyone that can avoid paying personal income taxes and still pull-off an appointment to Treasury Secretary (and run the IRS) is pretty smart. But our gripe is the fact that the guy instills negative confidence in the market place not because he lacks “leadership qualities,” as some have suggested, but because his economics seems all screwed up in my most humble opinion. We are in a gut wrenching transition in the global economy because the wildest orgy of debt the world has ever seen is over. Thus, excesses across all sectors, especially financial, must be removed from the marketplace in order for real quality long-term globally balanced growth to take hold. Instead, day after day we witness dinosaur saving from Geithner and friends, while stunningly they tell us this with a straight face (as straight as any government official possibly can) that we need to put more debt into the market in order to solve the problem of too much debt being in the market. Mr. Orwell call your office!
Now granted, few of us have toiled away at the top economic Ivy League institutions and rubbed elbows and other things against the top seers. Granted, we don’t have the luxury of feeding our ideas and inputs into the most sophisticated econometrics models imaginable built of course by the “best and brightest.” But it seems our angst grows from something the power elites don’t have—common sense. Putting more debt into a system desperately working to alleviate debt is just plain stupid no matter how the Neo-Keynesians slice or dice it. Is it any wonder why the globe is losing confidence in the dollar? It seems the guys that are supposed to be on our side consistently cow-tow to the other side. And of course, you know where I’m going here—China. It is farcical when China criticizes the US for overconsumption and not saving enough. They were enriched precisely because of the overconsumption, besides playing our multi-national “leaders” like a violin by offering cheap labor and short-term riches in turn for giving them technology which sooner or later will lead to the wiping out western business and sunk shareholder value as we know it. But that is another story for another day. The symbiotic game of China shipping containers full of stuff to the US for Federal Reserve Notes dwindling in value ended with the credit crunch. And guess which of the two formerly symbiotic players is getting crunched harder—if you said China you would have been right. But, in their Orwellian world of global chess, the Chinese pretend they are outperforming anything that moves. And their noises and lies and bluffs and fake economic numbers cannot deny the fact that if Mr. US Consumer does not get this symbiotic game of dollars for stuff going again, the Politburo may be out of a job—literally thrown out of a job, if you know what I mean. So, instead of realizing this upper hand of consumer demand the US possesses, the US government economic “leaders” agree with China that yes—it is highly important to stimulate the globe, we want 2001 again. If successful it would mean China continues to add global market share to their manufacturing behemoth and can avoid the dirty hard job of developing a domestic market.
Jack Crooks, Black Swan Capital LLC
www.blackswantrading.com
Black Swan Capital’s Currency Currents is strictly an informational publication and does not provide individual, customized
investment advice. The money you allocate to futures or forex should be strictly the money you can afford to risk. Detailed
disclaimer can be found at http://www.blackswantrading.com/disclaimer.html
Please read the whole article here:http://www.blackswantrading.com/files/articles/5b3a61794823258ee9df38f59319d335bsccc052209.pdf
Labels:
bailout plan,
credit crisis,
financial crisis,
Geithner
Thursday, March 12, 2009
Greenspan others responsible for the Financial Crisis
Former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan defended his "easy money" policies today in the Wall Street Journal, saying they did not cause the housing bubble. He placed the blame on the extreme growth in China and other emerging markets, which led to an excess of savings that pushed global long-term interest rates down between 2000 and 2005. Before this phenomenon, Greenspan argues, mortgage rates and the benchmark fed-funds rate moved "in lockstep."
Greenspan can say what he wants. But when the government guarantees the balance sheets of Fannie and Freddie (not to mention every other large bank in the country)... when it encourages the creation of an enormous amount of credit by lowering short-term interest rates to 1%... and when Congress insists on providing loans with no down payments to low-income and first-time homebuyers, you will eventually have a disaster.
There was either no risk, or very little risk, to home speculators. Banks didn't rein in lending because depositors don't care how risky a bank's loan book becomes – their deposits are guaranteed. Fannie and Freddie could buy an unlimited amount of subprime debt (with almost no loss reserves) because they had a line of credit with the Treasury. Greenspan didn't worry about the credit bubble because the market is efficient. Everyone acted like a fool because no one was going to be responsible for his actions.
Parsing the blame accurately is probably impossible, but one thing should be obvious to all of us: Greenspan had a hell of a lot more to do with it than 99% of his fellow Americans, who are now left with a multitrillion-dollar bill to clean up the mess.
Greenspan can say what he wants. But when the government guarantees the balance sheets of Fannie and Freddie (not to mention every other large bank in the country)... when it encourages the creation of an enormous amount of credit by lowering short-term interest rates to 1%... and when Congress insists on providing loans with no down payments to low-income and first-time homebuyers, you will eventually have a disaster.
There was either no risk, or very little risk, to home speculators. Banks didn't rein in lending because depositors don't care how risky a bank's loan book becomes – their deposits are guaranteed. Fannie and Freddie could buy an unlimited amount of subprime debt (with almost no loss reserves) because they had a line of credit with the Treasury. Greenspan didn't worry about the credit bubble because the market is efficient. Everyone acted like a fool because no one was going to be responsible for his actions.
Parsing the blame accurately is probably impossible, but one thing should be obvious to all of us: Greenspan had a hell of a lot more to do with it than 99% of his fellow Americans, who are now left with a multitrillion-dollar bill to clean up the mess.
Wednesday, February 25, 2009
Growing East/West Divide in the EU?
Greeting from RGE Monitor!
The Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region is the sick man of emerging markets. While the global crisis means few, if any, bright spots worldwide, the situation in the CEE area is particularly bleak. After almost a decade of outpacing worldwide growth, the region looks set to contract in 2009, with almost every country either in or on the verge of recession. The once high-flying Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) look headed for double-digit contractions, while countries relatively less affected by the crisis (i.e. Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia) will have a hard time posting even positive growth. Meanwhile, Hungary and Latvia’s economies already deteriorated to the point where IMF help was needed late last year.
The CEE’s ill health is primarily driven by two factors – collapsing exports and the drying-up of capital inflows. Exports were key to the region's economic success, accounting for a significant 80-90% of GDP in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. By far the biggest market for CEE goods is the Eurozone, which is now in recession. Meanwhile, the global credit crunch has dried up capital inflows to the region. An easy flow of credit fueled Eastern Europe’s boom in recent years, but the good times are gone. According to the Institute of International Finance, net private capital flows to Emerging Europe are projected to fall from an estimated $254 billion in 2008 to $30 billion in 2009. Whether or not this is formally considered a ‘sudden stop’ of capital, it will necessitate a very painful adjustment process.
Classic Emerging Markets Crisis In The Works?
What is especially worrisome is that the days of easy credit flows were accompanied by rising external imbalances that rival or even exceed the build-up of imbalances in pre-crisis Asia – e.g. current account deficits in Southeast Asia from 1995-97 fell within the 3.0-8.5% of GDP range, while those in CEE were in the double-digits in Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltics in 2008. As examined in a recent RGE analysis piece, the vulnerabilities in many CEE countries – high foreign currency borrowing, hefty levels of external debt and massive current-account deficits – suggest the classic makings of a capital account crisis a la Asia in the late 1990s.
Spillover Effects To Rest Of World
Like the Asia crisis of 1997-98, a regional crisis in Eastern Europe would have far-reaching effects. As Harvard professor Kenneth Rogoff noted in a recent New York Times article: “There’s a domino effect. International credit markets are linked, and so a snowballing credit crisis in Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries could cause New York municipal bonds to fall.” Western Europe looks set to be particularly impacted via its strong trade and financial linkages. Of particular concern is the strong presence of Western European banks (via subsidiaries) in the CEE, where they hold 60-90% market share depending on the country, which paves the way for contagion.
So is this the making of a cross-border banking crisis? It could be. Given the sharp contraction in Eastern Europe’s economies, combined with high foreign currency-denominated lending (particularly in Croatia, Hungary and Romania), weakening currencies and heavy reliance on non-deposit external financing, Eastern Europe’s banks will likely see a large spike in non-performing loans. Banking systems in the region are likely only as strong as their weakest link – or in this case, weakest country. That’s because of the ‘common lender’ phenomenon. As many CEE countries share foreign parent bank(s) in common, this paves the way for problems in just one of these countries to have ripple effects into other CEE countries. So even a relatively healthy economy/banking system like the Czech Republic’s – with a reasonable loan-to-deposit ratio and scant fx-denominated lending to households – is still vulnerable.
Austria is far and away the Western European country most heavily exposed to the CEE region (via Austrian-based banks like Raiffeisen and Erste Bank). These banks’ collective exposure to the region amounts to over 70% of Austria’s GDP. Notably, however, other Western European countries’ total exposure is far less. Belgium and Sweden are the next in line after Austria; their lenders’ total exposure to the region amounts to a still significant 20-25% of GDP. Some fear that parent banks, if they get into trouble, could either fire-sell subsidiaries or simply walk away. Another concern is Europe’s fragmented regulatory system, which means that if a cross-border bank needs to be unwound, the process is likely to be extremely messy.
Policymakers In Virtual Straitjackets
CEE policymakers have fairly limited tools to cope with the crisis. Fiscal policy is constrained by the fact that belt-tightening is required to restore order to the balance of payments in some countries (i.e. Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, and the Baltics), while euro adoption ambitions limit the fiscal response in others (i.e. Poland). Meanwhile, monetary policy easing is constrained in countries with heavy foreign currency-denominated lending, like Hungary and Romania, where a weakening of the local currency could potentially trigger defaults, thereby impacting financial stability. In others (i.e. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), monetary policy is not an available tool due to fixed exchange rates.
Due to limited fiscal and monetary policy options, other CEE countries might need to follow in the footsteps of Latvia and Hungary and call on IMF help. In a nod to the difficult situation of many CEE countries, EU leaders called last week for IMF resources to be doubled to $500 billion to help head off new problems in crisis-hit countries. It remains to be seen, however, whether IMF help will be enough to return financial stability to the region.
In a recent research report, economists from Danske Bank point to the increasing concern of spill-back from problems in Eastern Europe to the Eurozone. Polish authorities and commentators, such as Wolfgang Munchau, recently made the point that East European countries should be given a shortcut to join the euro and access to its safety and stability net. However, current problems faced by some EMU members show that EMU membership alone is no panacea. Moreover, previous experience shows that currency pegs can be double-edged swords that often end in capitulation. The current test case for the entire region is Latvia, whose currency peg looks increasingly fragile even after its IMF-led EUR 7.5 billion bailout package. Devaluation with its ripple effects through the region would be devastating for the mostly foreign-owned banks in the region.
Unlike EMU member countries, EU countries that have not yet adopted the euro have access to the 'medium-term financial assistance' facility worth EUR 25 billion, of which EUR 10 billion in loans have already been extended to Latvia and Hungary. Additional assistance to the region will have to come from a revamped IMF, as noted before and the EBRD is also providing funds to banks in the region. Despite a 20% funding boost, however, its resources are much smaller.
Spotlight On Ukraine
European banks are also exposed to vulnerable economies outside of the EU. Russia is the second largest borrower from EU banks and it has over $100 billion of debt that must be financed this year. However, it is the Ukraine that may pose the biggest contagion risk, particularly if the next tranche of IMF funding continues to be deferred. Austrian, French, Swedish, Italian and German banks have a collective exposure of around EUR 30 billion to the Ukraine. Ukraine has $46 billion in foreign debt obligations falling due in 2009 and the swift plunge of the Hyrvnia has boosted the cost of servicing these debts even as corporate debts are on the rise. Ukraine’s political divisions and economic contraction of at least 6% suggest further sovereign and corporate ratings downgrades are on the way. Ukraine may thus be forced to make the budget cuts required by the IMF, but it is also reaching out to the U.S., Russia, China, Japan and the EU for additional funds.
Government Collapse in Latvia: More Yet To Come?
The series of riots that erupted in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia in January, followed by Latvia’s government collapse last week, raise concerns that Eastern European countries may experience a period of deep destabilization and social strife as the economic crisis deepens and unemployment rates soar. The recent wave of popular unrest was not isolated to Eastern Europe. Ireland, Iceland, France, the UK and Greece also experienced street protests, but many Eastern European governments seem more vulnerable as they have limited policy options to address the crisis and little or no room for fiscal stimulus due to budgetary or financing constrains. Deeply unpopular austerity measures including slashed public wages, tax hikes and curbs on social spending will keep fanning public discontent in the Baltic states, Hungary and Romania. Dissatisfaction linked to the economic woes will be amplified in the countries where governments have been weakened by high-profile corruption and fraud scandals (Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria). The political forces most likely to benefit from public disaffection are those running on the populist platforms, which could disrupt efforts to battle the effects of the economic crisis. Latvia could be a case in point, as there are growing concerns that the coming election campaign might suspend the fiscal austerity measures required by the IMF bail-out package. Two other political hotspots that are at risk of early elections are Romania and Estonia, while Bulgarian national elections are due in mid-2009.
EU’s Free Market Rules Under Pressure: Eastern Disillusionment and Western Protectionism
Overall, a big rise in support for populist and radical parties in the region could put social, structural and environmental reforms on hold in the region and could even call into question the economic and political model Eastern European countries have followed since the 1990s. The eastern EU member states’ decisions to open their markets and move toward greater integration with the EU are now being second-guessed by some. Moreover, the protectionist measures implemented in some western EU states in support of their automotive and financial sectors are threatening the EU’s single market rules and could particularly hurt Eastern European economies. Meanwhile, a backlash over immigrant labor is likely. With the 2009 unemployment rate set to rise to 8.75% in the EU27, according to the European Commission, member states are tempted to interpret the laws in a way more favorable to their nationals. This suggests that migration trends will reverse and the eastward flow of remittances will dwindle. The return of Eastern European migrant workers, in turn, may add to social discontent in their countries of origin.
The financial crisis has exacerbated the East/West divide within the EU illustrated by the persistent bickering between the Czech Republic, the current holder of the EU presidency and France over trade and protectionist bail out packages that hurt automotive industries in Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. So far, the EU has helped economically troubled Latvia, Poland and Hungary with swap lines and loans and called for the resources of the IMF to double in order to help the countries facing the crisis. Yet, there have been a growing number of calls for EU-led coordinated support to the Eastern European economies (recently echoed by the World Bank). If there is a perceived lack of help, the financial crisis could deepen the divide between so called “Old Europe” and “New Europe” and bring structural changes to the political landscape in Eastern Europe, such as strengthening the nationalist, euro-skeptic voices in Central Europe (Czech Republic, Poland) and the pro-Russian parties in the Baltic states.
The Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region is the sick man of emerging markets. While the global crisis means few, if any, bright spots worldwide, the situation in the CEE area is particularly bleak. After almost a decade of outpacing worldwide growth, the region looks set to contract in 2009, with almost every country either in or on the verge of recession. The once high-flying Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) look headed for double-digit contractions, while countries relatively less affected by the crisis (i.e. Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia) will have a hard time posting even positive growth. Meanwhile, Hungary and Latvia’s economies already deteriorated to the point where IMF help was needed late last year.
The CEE’s ill health is primarily driven by two factors – collapsing exports and the drying-up of capital inflows. Exports were key to the region's economic success, accounting for a significant 80-90% of GDP in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. By far the biggest market for CEE goods is the Eurozone, which is now in recession. Meanwhile, the global credit crunch has dried up capital inflows to the region. An easy flow of credit fueled Eastern Europe’s boom in recent years, but the good times are gone. According to the Institute of International Finance, net private capital flows to Emerging Europe are projected to fall from an estimated $254 billion in 2008 to $30 billion in 2009. Whether or not this is formally considered a ‘sudden stop’ of capital, it will necessitate a very painful adjustment process.
Classic Emerging Markets Crisis In The Works?
What is especially worrisome is that the days of easy credit flows were accompanied by rising external imbalances that rival or even exceed the build-up of imbalances in pre-crisis Asia – e.g. current account deficits in Southeast Asia from 1995-97 fell within the 3.0-8.5% of GDP range, while those in CEE were in the double-digits in Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltics in 2008. As examined in a recent RGE analysis piece, the vulnerabilities in many CEE countries – high foreign currency borrowing, hefty levels of external debt and massive current-account deficits – suggest the classic makings of a capital account crisis a la Asia in the late 1990s.
Spillover Effects To Rest Of World
Like the Asia crisis of 1997-98, a regional crisis in Eastern Europe would have far-reaching effects. As Harvard professor Kenneth Rogoff noted in a recent New York Times article: “There’s a domino effect. International credit markets are linked, and so a snowballing credit crisis in Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries could cause New York municipal bonds to fall.” Western Europe looks set to be particularly impacted via its strong trade and financial linkages. Of particular concern is the strong presence of Western European banks (via subsidiaries) in the CEE, where they hold 60-90% market share depending on the country, which paves the way for contagion.
So is this the making of a cross-border banking crisis? It could be. Given the sharp contraction in Eastern Europe’s economies, combined with high foreign currency-denominated lending (particularly in Croatia, Hungary and Romania), weakening currencies and heavy reliance on non-deposit external financing, Eastern Europe’s banks will likely see a large spike in non-performing loans. Banking systems in the region are likely only as strong as their weakest link – or in this case, weakest country. That’s because of the ‘common lender’ phenomenon. As many CEE countries share foreign parent bank(s) in common, this paves the way for problems in just one of these countries to have ripple effects into other CEE countries. So even a relatively healthy economy/banking system like the Czech Republic’s – with a reasonable loan-to-deposit ratio and scant fx-denominated lending to households – is still vulnerable.
Austria is far and away the Western European country most heavily exposed to the CEE region (via Austrian-based banks like Raiffeisen and Erste Bank). These banks’ collective exposure to the region amounts to over 70% of Austria’s GDP. Notably, however, other Western European countries’ total exposure is far less. Belgium and Sweden are the next in line after Austria; their lenders’ total exposure to the region amounts to a still significant 20-25% of GDP. Some fear that parent banks, if they get into trouble, could either fire-sell subsidiaries or simply walk away. Another concern is Europe’s fragmented regulatory system, which means that if a cross-border bank needs to be unwound, the process is likely to be extremely messy.
Policymakers In Virtual Straitjackets
CEE policymakers have fairly limited tools to cope with the crisis. Fiscal policy is constrained by the fact that belt-tightening is required to restore order to the balance of payments in some countries (i.e. Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, and the Baltics), while euro adoption ambitions limit the fiscal response in others (i.e. Poland). Meanwhile, monetary policy easing is constrained in countries with heavy foreign currency-denominated lending, like Hungary and Romania, where a weakening of the local currency could potentially trigger defaults, thereby impacting financial stability. In others (i.e. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), monetary policy is not an available tool due to fixed exchange rates.
Due to limited fiscal and monetary policy options, other CEE countries might need to follow in the footsteps of Latvia and Hungary and call on IMF help. In a nod to the difficult situation of many CEE countries, EU leaders called last week for IMF resources to be doubled to $500 billion to help head off new problems in crisis-hit countries. It remains to be seen, however, whether IMF help will be enough to return financial stability to the region.
In a recent research report, economists from Danske Bank point to the increasing concern of spill-back from problems in Eastern Europe to the Eurozone. Polish authorities and commentators, such as Wolfgang Munchau, recently made the point that East European countries should be given a shortcut to join the euro and access to its safety and stability net. However, current problems faced by some EMU members show that EMU membership alone is no panacea. Moreover, previous experience shows that currency pegs can be double-edged swords that often end in capitulation. The current test case for the entire region is Latvia, whose currency peg looks increasingly fragile even after its IMF-led EUR 7.5 billion bailout package. Devaluation with its ripple effects through the region would be devastating for the mostly foreign-owned banks in the region.
Unlike EMU member countries, EU countries that have not yet adopted the euro have access to the 'medium-term financial assistance' facility worth EUR 25 billion, of which EUR 10 billion in loans have already been extended to Latvia and Hungary. Additional assistance to the region will have to come from a revamped IMF, as noted before and the EBRD is also providing funds to banks in the region. Despite a 20% funding boost, however, its resources are much smaller.
Spotlight On Ukraine
European banks are also exposed to vulnerable economies outside of the EU. Russia is the second largest borrower from EU banks and it has over $100 billion of debt that must be financed this year. However, it is the Ukraine that may pose the biggest contagion risk, particularly if the next tranche of IMF funding continues to be deferred. Austrian, French, Swedish, Italian and German banks have a collective exposure of around EUR 30 billion to the Ukraine. Ukraine has $46 billion in foreign debt obligations falling due in 2009 and the swift plunge of the Hyrvnia has boosted the cost of servicing these debts even as corporate debts are on the rise. Ukraine’s political divisions and economic contraction of at least 6% suggest further sovereign and corporate ratings downgrades are on the way. Ukraine may thus be forced to make the budget cuts required by the IMF, but it is also reaching out to the U.S., Russia, China, Japan and the EU for additional funds.
Government Collapse in Latvia: More Yet To Come?
The series of riots that erupted in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia in January, followed by Latvia’s government collapse last week, raise concerns that Eastern European countries may experience a period of deep destabilization and social strife as the economic crisis deepens and unemployment rates soar. The recent wave of popular unrest was not isolated to Eastern Europe. Ireland, Iceland, France, the UK and Greece also experienced street protests, but many Eastern European governments seem more vulnerable as they have limited policy options to address the crisis and little or no room for fiscal stimulus due to budgetary or financing constrains. Deeply unpopular austerity measures including slashed public wages, tax hikes and curbs on social spending will keep fanning public discontent in the Baltic states, Hungary and Romania. Dissatisfaction linked to the economic woes will be amplified in the countries where governments have been weakened by high-profile corruption and fraud scandals (Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria). The political forces most likely to benefit from public disaffection are those running on the populist platforms, which could disrupt efforts to battle the effects of the economic crisis. Latvia could be a case in point, as there are growing concerns that the coming election campaign might suspend the fiscal austerity measures required by the IMF bail-out package. Two other political hotspots that are at risk of early elections are Romania and Estonia, while Bulgarian national elections are due in mid-2009.
EU’s Free Market Rules Under Pressure: Eastern Disillusionment and Western Protectionism
Overall, a big rise in support for populist and radical parties in the region could put social, structural and environmental reforms on hold in the region and could even call into question the economic and political model Eastern European countries have followed since the 1990s. The eastern EU member states’ decisions to open their markets and move toward greater integration with the EU are now being second-guessed by some. Moreover, the protectionist measures implemented in some western EU states in support of their automotive and financial sectors are threatening the EU’s single market rules and could particularly hurt Eastern European economies. Meanwhile, a backlash over immigrant labor is likely. With the 2009 unemployment rate set to rise to 8.75% in the EU27, according to the European Commission, member states are tempted to interpret the laws in a way more favorable to their nationals. This suggests that migration trends will reverse and the eastward flow of remittances will dwindle. The return of Eastern European migrant workers, in turn, may add to social discontent in their countries of origin.
The financial crisis has exacerbated the East/West divide within the EU illustrated by the persistent bickering between the Czech Republic, the current holder of the EU presidency and France over trade and protectionist bail out packages that hurt automotive industries in Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. So far, the EU has helped economically troubled Latvia, Poland and Hungary with swap lines and loans and called for the resources of the IMF to double in order to help the countries facing the crisis. Yet, there have been a growing number of calls for EU-led coordinated support to the Eastern European economies (recently echoed by the World Bank). If there is a perceived lack of help, the financial crisis could deepen the divide between so called “Old Europe” and “New Europe” and bring structural changes to the political landscape in Eastern Europe, such as strengthening the nationalist, euro-skeptic voices in Central Europe (Czech Republic, Poland) and the pro-Russian parties in the Baltic states.
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