Subprime 2.0 Is Coming Soon to a Suburb Near You: Edward Pinto

Commentary by Edward Pinto
(Edward Pinto, a mortgage-finance consultant, was executive vice president and chief credit officer at Fannie Mae from 1987 to 1989. The opinions expressed are his own.)

Sept. 8 (Bloomberg) -- On the second anniversary of the bailouts of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, it’s now obvious that weak lending standards, serving the political interest of affordable housing for all, were the main reason for the nation’s mortgage meltdown.
But the government just can’t permit lending to anyone and everyone; it must insist on prudent judgment about who will repay and who will default. Not only will borrowers who lack a down payment, steady income, employment and a good credit history probably get into trouble -- surprise! -- but too much irresponsible lending also creates artificial demand for houses, driving prices into the stratosphere and, as we have just experienced, puts all homeowners at risk.
The same mistake occurred in 1929, when any investor could buy stocks on margin with as little as 10 percent down. Small wonder that after the crash the U.S. government instituted a margin requirement of 50 percent down.
Congress should apply the same principle to housing purchases, increasing the amount a buyer must put down and other safeguards to assure prudent lending. Congress refuses to do this. Why? Giving citizens cheap, easy housing is a great way to win votes, no matter what horrific repercussions ensue.

Who’s Following Whom?

Consider the prevailing narrative that holds a greed-driven private sector responsible for the 2008 financial crisis. A secondary narrative points to a greed-driven Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac abandoning their credit standards in an effort to follow the lead of Wall Street.
If these explanations fail to convince, a third blames a combination of deregulation and insufficient regulation, again driven by greed, as rulemakers were asleep at their posts.
What is missing is the central role played by an affordable housing policy built upon the misguided concept of loosened underwriting -- a policy created by Congress and implemented for
15 years by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and banking regulators.
From 1993 onward, regulators worked with weakened lending policies as mandated by Congress. These policies systematically dismantled a housing-finance system based on the common sense principles of adequate down payments, good credit, and an ability to handle the mortgage debt.

No Money Down

Substituted was a scam of liberalized lending standards that turned out to be no standards at all. In 1990, one in 200 home-purchase loans (all government insured) had a down payment of less than or equal to 3 percent. By 2003, one in seven home buyers had such a low down payment, and by 2006 about one in three put no money down.
These policies led millions of Americans to buy homes with little or no money down, impaired credit and insufficient income. As a result, our economy has been brought down and the taxpayers have had to foot the bill for bailout after bailout.
Congress and U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration refuse to learn the lesson that is painfully aware to American taxpayers, and they have made it clear that they have no intention of fixing broken underwriting.
Let’s start with the latest pieces of evidence. The Dodd- Frank Bill, signed in July 2010 by the president, omitted both an adequate down payment and a good credit history from the list of criteria indicating a lower risk of default as regulators sought to define a qualified residential mortgage.

‘Prudent Underwriting’

This was no oversight. Republican Senator Robert Corker and others proposed an amendment that would have added both a minimum down-payment requirement and consideration of credit history along with the establishment by regulators of a “prudent underwriting” standard. This amendment was defeated.
In early September 2010, Fannie and Freddie’s regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, following requirements set out in 2008 by Congress, finalized affordable housing mandates that are likely to prove more risky than those that led to Fannie and Freddie’s taxpayer bailout. As required by Congress, these new goals almost exclusively relate to very low- and low- income borrowers. Meeting these goals will necessitate a return to dangerous minimal down-payment lending, along with other imprudent lending standards.
Of course, FHFA Director Edward DeMarco notes that Fannie and Freddie aren’t to undertake risky lending to meet these goals. As has already been noted, Congress doesn’t consider low down payments and poor credit as indicative of risky lending.
How convenient.

Return to Subprime

The Federal Housing Administration, in its actuarial study released late last year, projected that it will return to an average FICO credit score of 635 by 2013. This signals the FHA’s intention to return to subprime lending. Once again, Dodd-Frank supports this policy change.
The FHA, the Veterans Affairs Department and the Agriculture Department’s grip on the home-purchase market increases month by month. They now guarantee more than half of all home-purchase loans. However, skin in the game isn’t a requirement. For example, the FHA’s average down payment is just
4 percent. Even this meager amount disappears after adjusting for seller concessions and financed insurance premiums.
On Christmas Eve in 2009, the Treasury Department announced new terms to the bailouts of Fannie and Freddie. Starting on Jan. 1, 2013, the terms of the bailout agreement provide for a continuing obligation to provide about $274 billion in capital to Fannie and Freddie. This amount is in addition to the unlimited sums that are available between now and Dec. 31, 2012.
As a result, one or both of these entities can now continue indefinitely as zombie institutions under conservatorship.
As a society, we have to go back to at least 20 percent down, with limited exceptions. Credit histories need to be solid. Documentation has to be iron-clad. Lender capital levels need to be raised.
Here’s my proposal to bring Congress’s penchant for imprudent lending to a quick end: All congressional pension assets should be invested in funds backed solely by the high- risk loans mandated by federal housing legislation. I have a feeling that things would change fast.

A Must Watch: Especially William K Black - the last 8 mns

(click on the heading above for full interview)

The startling nature of the coverup of wrongdoing in the current financial crisis is revealed by William K Black. He has the perfect credentials for making this indictment ...he ran the Savings and Loan cleanup in the 1980's.
Quite successfully, mind you.
This is something everyone can understand and must take to heart. The next financial crisis is baked in and there is no recovery from the current crisis until the issues Black discusses are addressed.

IMF: Reform law fails to simplify the complex U.S. regulatory system

The U.S. law to overhaul financial regulation leaves the fate of mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac undecided and does not simplify the complicated system that governs securities and banking, the International Monetary Fund said. How the law is implemented will determine whether it accomplishes its objectives, the IMF said. The New York Times. Ha, at last someone noticed this and we haven't even begun the myriad of studies that have to be done as part of this.

Obama signs a bill that lets banks have US over a barrel once more

Another from The Telegraph. The article states that... "Last week, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform bill – hailed as the most sweeping overhaul of US financial regulation since the 1930s." But reporter Liam Halligan thinks otherwise... "Based on sound-thinking courageous judgment, the Glass-Steagall legislation was only 17 pages long. Packed with wheezes and loop-holes, Dodd-Frank runs to 2,319 pages. Enough said."

Ford works with the SEC on a sale of bonds backed by auto loans

Politicians, in their naieve zeal to regulate, have forced a pre-birth exception to the new law that is likely to become permanent:

Ford Motor Credit delayed a sale of bonds backed by auto loans last week because of regulatory uncertainty caused by the financial overhaul. On Monday, Ford sold a billion-dollar bond by working with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Ford and
the SEC created a reprieve to a part of the law that holds credit rating agencies liable for ratings they issue. "Clearly, the SEC recognizes the importance of the public [asset-backed securities] markets, and we are glad the staff is taking temporary measures to ensure public markets continue to be available by establishing a transitional period through Jan. 24, 2011," a spokeswoman wrote.
The Wall Street Journal

The SEC realizes the importance of keeping credit markets open; laws written by lobbyists and political operatives with no actual experience of real life business operations are inevitably going to harm the economy. They will force "exceptions" until the reality of daily business makes a mockery of the law now administered by an increased burocracy at immense permanent additional expense to the taxpayer.

Regulatory reform will affect municipal and corporate bonds differently

The overhaul of financial regulation will affect corporate bonds and municipal bonds differently, partly because corporate bonds are registered securities. That difference is meaningful as market participants work to unravel the law and its
unintended consequences, according to CNBC.

The immediate fallout from "Financial Reform"

Umintended consequences strike again. Dodd-Frank is already an economic disaster: German Banks are fleeing the NYSE, parts of the Mortgage market are shut down or operating with emergency exemptions and under temporary rules from the SEC, Fannie and Fredie are bankrupt..why dont they have to operate under the same rules?

.At least 2 issuers pull sales of asset-backed bonds: Ford Motor Credit and at least one other issuer reacted to problems with credit rating agencies by pulling planned sales of asset-backed bonds, fund managers and traders said. Rating agencies are no longer allowing issuers of asset-backed securities to use their ratings in bond
prospectuses because of liability raised by the regulatory overhaul. Reuters

.SEC temporarily eases rules for issuers of asset-backed bonds The Securities and Exchange Commission is aiming to help issuers of asset-backed bonds comply with rules that are part of the regulatory revamp by temporarily allowing them to omit credit ratings on their filings. Meredith Cross, director of the corporatefinance
division at the SEC, said credit rating agencies are not allowing borrowers to include rankings in registration statements. "This action will provide issuers, rating agencies and other market participants with a transition period in order to implement changes to comply," Cross said. Bloomberg

.Germany's corporate giants pull out of the U.S. stock market The biggest companies in Germany are walking away from the New York Stock Exchange and other U.S. securities markets, deciding that financial regulation, lawsuits and accounting rules in the country are more trouble than they're worth. Deutsche Telekom and Allianz are the latest German blue-chip corporations to flee Wall Street. Germany's DAX index of prestigious, household-name firms once had 11 companies on the NYSE, but the number has fallen to four.
Spiegel Online

Summary Of Major Provisions In Financial Overhaul Bill

WASHINGTON -(Dow Jones)- The sweeping financial overhaul legislation negotiators wrapped up early Friday morning would constitute the biggest overhaul of U.S. financial regulations since the 1930s. The legislation, broadly, is designed to close the regulatory gaps and end the speculative trading practices that contributed to the 2008 financial market crisis. Major components of the bill include:

NEW REGULATORY AUTHORITY: Gives federal regulators new authority to seize and break up large troubled financial firms without taxpayer bailouts in cases where the firm's collapse could destabilize the financial system. Sets up a liquidation procedure run by the FDIC. Treasury would supply funds to cover the up-front costs of winding down the failed firm, but the government would have to put a "repayment plan" in place. Regulators would recoup any losses incurred from the wind-down afterwards by assessing fees on financial firms with more than $50 billion in assets.

FINANCIAL STABILITY COUNCIL: Would establish a new, 10-member Financial Stability Oversight Council, comprising existing regulators charged with monitoring and addressing system-wide risks to the nation's financial stability. Among its duties, the council would recommend to the Fed stricter capital, leverage and other rules for large, complex financial firms that are judged to threaten the financial system. In extreme cases, it would have the power to break up financial firms.

VOLCKER RULE: Would curb propriety trading by the largest financial firms, though banks could make de minimus investments in hedge and private-equity funds. Those investments would be limited to 3% or less of a bank's Tier 1 capital. Banks would be prohibited from bailing out a fund in which they are invested.

DERIVATIVES: Would for the first time extend comprehensive regulation to the over-the-counter derivatives market, including the trading of the products and the companies that sell them. Would require many routine derivatives to be traded on exchanges and routed through clearinghouses. Customized swaps could still be traded over-the-counter, but they would have to be reported to central repositories so regulators could get a broader picture of what's going on in the market. Would impose new capital, margin, reporting, record-keeping and business conduct rules on firms that deal in derivatives.

SWAPS SPIN-OFF: Would require banks to spin off only their riskiest derivatives trading operations into affiliates, in a late-night compromise struck to scale back a controversial provision championed by Sen. Blanche Lincoln (D., Ark.). Banks would be able to retain operations for interest-rate swaps, foreign-exchange swaps, and gold and silver swaps among others. Firms would be required to push trading in agriculture, uncleared commodities, most metals, and energy swaps to their affiliates.

CONSUMER AGENCY: Would create a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau within the Federal Reserve, with rulemaking and some enforcement power over banks and non-banks that offer consumer financial products or services such as credit cards, mortgages and other loans. The new watchdog would have authority to examine and enforce regulations for all mortgage-related businesses; banks and credit unions with assets of more than $10 billion in assets; pay day lenders, check cashers and certain other non-bank financial firms. Auto dealers won a hard-fought exemption from the Bureau's reach.

PRE-EMPTION: Would allow states to impose their own stricter consumer protection laws on national banks. National banks could seek exemption from state laws on a case-by-case, state-by-state basis if a state law "prevents or significantly interferes" with the bank's ability to do business - a higher bar than federal regulators currently must meet to pre-empt state rules. State attorneys-general would have power to enforce certain rules issued by the new consumer financial protection bureau.

FEDERAL RESERVE OVERSIGHT: Would mandate a one-time audit of all of the Fed's emergency lending programs from the financial crisis. The Fed also would disclose, with a two-year lag, details of loans it makes to banks through its discount window as well as open market transactions - activity the Fed currently doesn't disclose. Would eliminate the role of bankers in picking presidents at the Fed's 12 regional banks. Would also limit the Fed's 13(3) emergency lending authority by barring the central bank from using it to aid an individual firm, requiring the Treasury Secretary to approve any lending program and prohibiting the participation of insolvent firms.

OVERSIGHT CHANGES: Would eliminate the Office of Thrift Supervision, but after a fight, the Fed retained oversight of thousands of community banks. Would empower the Fed to supervise the largest, most complex financial companies to ensure that the government understands the risks and complexities of firms that could pose a risk to the broader economy.

BANK CAPITAL STANDARDS: Would set new size- and risk-based capital standards, including a prohibition on large bank holding companies treating trust-preferred securities as Tier 1 capital, a key measure of a bank's strength. Would grandfather trust-preferred securities for banks with less than $15 billion in assets, enabling them to continue treating the securities as Tier 1 capital. Larger banks would have five years to phase-out trust-preferred securities as Tier 1 capital.

BANK FEE: Would mandate the Oversight Council to impose a special assessment on the nation's largest financial firms to raise up to $19 billion to offset the cost of the bill. The fee would apply to financial institutions with more than $ 50 billion in assets and hedge funds with more than $10 billion in assets, with entities deemed high risk paying more than safer ones. The fee would be collected by the FDIC over five years, with the funds placed in separate fund in the Treasury and would not be usable for any other purpose for 25 years, after which any left-over funds would go to pay down the national debt.

DEPOSIT INSURANCE: Would permanently increase the level of federal deposit insurance for banks, thrifts and credit unions to $250,000, retroactive to January 1, 2008.

MORTGAGES: Would establish new national minimum underwriting standards for home mortgages. Lenders would be required for the first time to ensure that a borrower is able to repay a home loan by verifying the borrower's income, credit history and job status. Would ban payments to brokers for steering borrowers to high-priced loans.

SECURITIZATION: Banks that package loans would, broadly, be required to keep 5% of the credit risk on their balance sheets. Would direct bank regulators to exempt from the rules a class of low-risk mortgages that meet certain minimum standards. Regulators could permit alternative risk-retention arrangements for the commercial mortgage-backed securities market.

CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: Would revamp the credit-rating industry, establishing a new quasi-government entity designed to address conflicts of interest inherent in the credit-rating business after the SEC studies the matter. Would also allow investors to sue credit-rating firms for a "knowing or reckless" failure to conduct a reasonable investigation, a lower liability standard than the firms were lobbying to get. Would establish a new oversight office within the SEC with the ability to fine ratings agencies and empowers the SEC to deregister a firm that gives too many bad ratings over time.

INVESTMENT ADVICE: Would give the SEC the authority to raise standards for broker dealers who give investment advice after the agency studies the issue. Would permit, but not require, the SEC to hold broker dealers to a fiduciary duty similar to the standard to which investment advisers are held.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: Would give shareholders of public corporations a non- binding vote on executive pay and "golden parachutes," and would give the SEC the authority to grant shareholders proxy access to nominate directors.

HEDGE FUNDS: Would require hedge funds and private equity funds to register with the SEC as investment advisers and to provide information on trades to help regulators monitor systemic risk.

INSURANCE: Would create a new Federal Insurance Office within the Treasury Department to monitor the insurance industry, recommending to the systemic risk council insurers that should be treated as systemically important. Would require the new office to report to Congress on ways to modernize insurance regulation.

-By Victoria McGrane, Dow Jones Newswires; 202-862-9267; victoria.mcgrane@ dowjones.com

(Michael R. Crittenden, Sarah N. Lynch and Jessica Holzer contributed to this story)


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